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a criminal existence, they showed themselves more ready to co- 668
operate.

Unfortunately, during this preliminary period discord broke out [578]●
in the OUN. One faction under Stepan Bandera objected to the leadership of Colonel Melnyk and demanded the change of several prominent leaders. When this was refused, a split came in the organization with Melnyk at the head of one faction and Bandera in control of the other. It is very possible that this split was the result of German intrigue to prevent the formation of a strong Ukrainian movement but it had the result of weakening it, even though both Bandera and Melnyk fell into German hands and were imprisoned during the rest of the war. Their followers continued and intensified the feud and even came to armed clashes.

Both factions of the OUN and similar groups strengthened themselves first along the borders and commenced to smuggle arms and ammunition from the west, so as to be prepared to act in case there came an armed clash between Germany and the USSR. Then, as the months passed, the network extended further into the country and the OUN became organized on a territorial basis under a Country Executive and the Country Leader, who were assisted by expert advisers on military affairs and propaganda.

While the two imperialistic powers were still friends, there was little possibility for open sabotage. The chief work of the Ukrainian patriotic underground was the spreading of the national spirit, the encouraging of the spirits of the oppressed, and the secret education of the masses in the hope of later action. They sought to counterbalance the Soviet propaganda and their efforts to enlist the young people in the Komsomols and train them as Communists. They worked upon some of the eastern Ukrainians who were moved by the Soviet regime to the west and they brought it about that some of these remained behind and joined their ranks when the break finally came in 1941.

Despite the efforts of the leaders to hold their followers in check, they were not always successful for some of the younger members were so enraged by the Bolshevik tactics that they could not be restrained from attempting individual acts of reprisal. These

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To round out the picture, however, one must add that the methods employed by the Ukrainians to win ground back from the Poles were not limited to cultural development. In line with the policy described above, the Germans frequently appointed mayors of ethnographically mixed towns from among the Ukrainian element, thus giving the latter a decided advantage in the civil administration. The separate police system was also staffed in a manner favorable to the Ukrainians, although the Germans closely supervised this force. Nevertheless, in numerous cases their position in the police detachments enabled the Ukrainians to harass and even to attack the Poles.[20]

While the Ukrainian nationalist forces were being strengthened by the creation of a new base in the Generalgouvernement, the OUN was being gravely weakened by a fierce internal conflict. The fundamental causes of this conflict have been examined in the preceding chapters. Its catalytic element was the liberation of the most active leaders of the younger generation from the Polish prisons.

In Cracow, where most went, they came into contact with the comrades with whom they had fought and suffered before their imprisonment, and a new grouping rapidly coalesced. The nominal leader was Volodymyr Lopatyns'kyi, who was the official director of the *krai* OUN—i.e., the organization on Ukrainian ethnographical territory in Poland.[21] Along with him came other young men who had long been active in the struggle against the Polish authorities—John Gavrusevych, Iaroslav Horbovyi, Leo Rebet, and many others. For the most part these men, vigorous as they were, had been confined, by the nature of their conspiratorial work, to Poland, and consequently were not very familiar with the broader aspects of the OUN. They were a hardened group of rebels, remarkably courageous and inured to a life of insecurity, but deprived by this very training of

[20] Activity report of the chief of the Ordnungspolizei, November 11, 1940, Occ E-2 (11), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-2 [11]). This German official reported that "lack of proper training" enabled the Ukrainian auxiliary police to take a partisan, even a vicious attitude toward the Poles, and gave as an example the necessity of arresting two Ukrainian officers who had failed to hinder attacks on Poles by armed Ukrainians.

[21] Interviews 24, 75.

the opportunity to consider theoretical and complex questions. There were among them, however, two young men who had recently had the opportunity of observing the workings of the organizational headquarters at first hand. One was Dmytro Myron, who was later to prove to be a talented organizer of undergrounds in the East Ukraine. The other was Iaroslav Stets'ko.[22]

Among the entire group, Stets'ko (a priest's son) was distinguished by his quick intelligence and ability to generalize his experiences in the form of political prescriptions. Like most of the others, he had been sentenced to imprisonment in connection with the mass trial of OUN members in 1936. However, he had not been proved to have been as deeply implicated as many, and consequently was released before the outbreak of war. Taking an active part in the organizational work of the OUN, he was called to Rome by Mel'nyk in the summer of 1939 to help in preparation of the Second Congress. Stets'ko's role in Rome is not entirely clear. According to one version, he was relieved of his preparatory duties by Stsibors'kyi when he proved unable to carry them out satisfactorily;[23] if this is true, the implied rebuke was hardly likely to increase his love for his supplanter, and might indeed have sown a seed of resentment against the entire leadership. At any rate, it appears clear that the Provid was not prescient enough to seize the opportunity to secure the lasting loyalty of this brilliant young OUN member.

In retrospect, at least, Stets'ko was doubtful of the wisdom of the policy he saw being implemented by the older men. It was a cautious policy, and a particularly distasteful aspect of its caution, according to Stets'ko, was the care taken to maintain good relations with Germany, in spite of the repeated disappointments which that power had inflicted on the Ukrainians. Before the close of the Rome meeting, however, Stets'ko had a reassuring conversation with Mel'nyk; after this, he temporarily threw his support behind his chief. Mel'nyk might have had some qualms about exalting himself as the chief of the Provid. In his youthful enthusiasm Stets'ko was willing to accept—at least in theory—

[22] Jaroslaw Stecko.
[23] Interview 67.

the full implications of the authoritarian strain in OUN ideology. In an enthusiastic speech he praised Mel'nyk as a great leader, a heroic fighter, and called for unswerving loyalty to him such as had been accorded Konovalets'—"The leader is dead, long live the leader!" [24]

By the beginning of 1940, Stets'ko, under the impact of the fresh defeat of the OUN policy of alignment with the Germans and the stimulation of more impatient members of his group, had begun to express grave doubts concerning the official leaders of the party. His abilities made him a valuable member of the emerging faction, but it was not the kind of body which seeks its leader among intellectuals. The basic charge which it made against the older generation was that it was timid, lacking in determination; consequently, it was fitting that the rebel group chose a leader who possessed to an unusual degree the qualities of inflexible will and readiness for desperate action. This leader was found in the peasant-born chief of the terrorist group which had carried out the attacks on the Polish officials—Stephen Bandera.

By January, 1940, the new alignment was sufficiently solidified for Bandera and Lopatyns'kyi to be able to go to Mel'nyk in Rome with a series of demands.[25] It is not clear precisely what these demands were, for the participants in the clash have held to opposite versions. According to Bandera's supporters, the kernel of their declaration was a demand for a change in orientation of OUN policy to make it less dependent on the Germans. In particular, they say their leaders demanded that Mel'nyk take the headquarters of the organization to a neutral state, and from this vantage point bring about cooperation between the OUN and the Western powers in forming a legion composed of Ukrainians in France to aid Finland in her defense against Soviet

[24] Text in *Nastup*, December 13, 1941, p. 3. This article was of course published long after the break, in order to discredit the Bandera followers. There is no doubt that an article of this general tenor was written, however. The discussion of this opening phase has been based primarily on interviews (24 and 67) with Ukrainian leaders particularly well acquainted with both sides of this early stage of the controversy.

[25] Stepan (Stephen) Bandera, "V desiatu richnytsiu stvorennia Revoliutsiinoho Provodu OUN" (On the Tenth Anniversary of the Creation of the Revolutionary Directorate of the OUN), *Surma* (February-March, 1950), p. 6

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attack.[26] While these contentions have a certain air of plausibility, in view of the past and future collaboration of the group around Mel'nyk with the Germans, the adherents of the official leader point out that Bandera himself cooperated with the Germans when it suited his purpose and that Mel'nyk followers in France worked with zeal for just such a legion as Bandera's supporters assert *they* proposed.[27]

While the content of many of the demands presented by Bandera and Lopatyns'kyi is disputed, it is generally agreed that the most precisely formulated item concerned a change in the composition of the Provid. The *krai* leaders demanded the dismissal of Baranovs'kyi,[28] Senyk, and Stsibors'kyi. Because of the influence exercised by the two last-named leaders, compliance with this demand would have meant a real revolution in the direction of the OUN, especially since Bandera and his companion urged that they be replaced by adherents of the younger group. Aside from the intrinsic importance of this element of the dispute, however, the reasons presented by the two emissaries do much to reveal the psychology of the young rebels.

The charge made against Senyk harks back to the earliest stages of dissension between the two generations in the Nationalist organization. When Bandera, Stets'ko, and the other Galician terrorists were arrested for attacks on Polish government officials, they were confronted with a mass of written evidence of conspiracy which made their defense hopeless, under the conditions prevailing in Poland. This material was obtained by the Poles from Czech officials, who had in turn obtained it in some unknown manner. What is clear, however, is that Senyk, in his capacity as administrative assistant to Konovalets', had initially prepared the documents. The *krai* group was bitter over this occurrence, attributing it to Senyk's negligence in preparing such dangerous documents and then in failing to safeguard them prop-

[26] Unlike the projected UNR legion mentioned in the preceding chapter, the OUN plan called for an armed unit entirely separate from the émigré Polish forces.

[27] Interview 52.

[28] For the involved charges against Baranovs'kyi, see *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 37; Interview 75.

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erly. Whether they were correct in this judgment is hard to determine, but one can readily understand how such a feeling could develop into hatred during the harsh years in prison. More fundamentally, however, the accusation indicates the difficult position of those who endeavor to direct a fanatic underground movement from outside the country where the movement must exist and suffer. It also sharply illuminates the basic tension between the man of action, of revolutionary *élan*, and the administrator who is never quite regarded as pulling his share of the load.

The accusation against Stsibors'kyi is even more revealing. Several years previously, when he was an editor of *Ukraïnske Slovo*, the OUN organ in Paris, Stsibors'kyi had been approached in the newspaper office by a Communist agent who tried to persuade him to betray the national cause. Instead of throwing the man out, so the story goes, Stsibors'kyi had engaged him in an ideological debate. The Bandera group now alleged that Stsibors'kyi had failed to act promptly because he was really considering the Communist's proposal, and bolstered their charge by asserting that the presence of Stsibors'kyi's sister in Kiev gave the Soviet network a grip on him. In view of Stsibors'kyi's vigor in the anti-Communist cause, before and after the incident, this accusation appears highly implausible. The emphasis on the culpability of his arguing with the Communist is, on the other hand, highly illuminating. As has been indicated, Stsibors'kyi was a born theorist, a man who served the movement primarily by words. Paradoxically, his own theory emphasized will, the need for action, and the primacy of the *Volkgeist*. It remained—a sort of poetic retribution—that his most extreme disciples, trained to condemn the rationalist, turned first against his reputation, and then in deadly earnest against his person.[29]

* The preceding discussion of the reasons for the split has been based primarily on interviews (especially 24, 52, 67, 75) with several of the principal protagonists and their close adherents. Published sources which deal with the controversy include Bandera and *OUN u Viini*, pp. 34–35, which represent the opposing viewpoints. Somewhat more impartial (though leaning toward the Mel'nyk side) is Vasyl' Rudko ("R. Lisovii"), "Rozlam v OUN" (The Split in the OUN), *Ukraïns'ki Visiti*, May 25, 1949, p. 3, and October 27, 1949, p. 3. Rudko also avoids attributing too much importance to the ostensible grounds of the split emphasized by both sides and correctly stresses that the principal source of conflict was a difference in temperament and background between the two generations.

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668* 578 Whatever discussion may have taken place over the *krai* representatives' other proposals, there is no question but that Mel'nyk firmly rejected the demand to dismiss his colleagues. His critics assert that this action is evidence of his inflexibility, or even of his haughty attitude toward the younger members of the organization. His admirers maintain that it is convincing proof of his devotion to principle, his loyalty to faithful companions. Whichever judgment is correct, the failure to reach an agreement soon led to open conflict. Bandera and Lopatyns'kyi returned home, and on February 10, at a secret conclave of the Galician youth leaders in Cracow, Bandera was designated the chief of a new, "revolutionary" Provid.[30]

Most of the remainder of 1940 was spent in a sharp struggle of the opposing factions to consolidate positions and win over uncommitted elements. At first the contest was conducted with some restraint on both sides. There remained some possibility of reconciliation.[31] Antagonism between the rival factions was greatly exacerbated, however, by efforts of the *krai* group to win over some of the senior members of the organization. Nearly all of the latter felt it was the height of presumption for the younger men to form a counter-directorate. Moreover, they asserted that the attempts of the Bandera followers to gain their sympathy amounted to urging them to betray their comrades; thus they felt the proposals were dishonorable as well as impertinent.[32] On the other hand, the young generation felt that it was merely attempting to overthrow an inflexible and arbitrary leadership in order to carry out the true aims of the organization. Consequently they bitterly resented the scornful rejection accorded them by the older men.

Matters came to a head with a series of coups and counter-coups in midsummer. For example, a group of young Bandera adherents tried to take over the headquarters of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow. The administrative officials, most of whom were not affiliated with the OUN, regarded them with more annoyance than outright hostility, but when Colonel Sushko

[30] Bandera, p. 4.
[31] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, October 19, 1941, p. 2; Bohdan Mykhailiuk, *Bunt Bandery* (Bandera's Rebellion) (1950), pp. 52 ff.
[32] *OUN u Viini*, p. 37.

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returned he quickly ejected them.[33] Then, in August, he led a small group of his followers, probably drawn from the auxiliary police units in which he was active, in a raid on the Bandera headquarters in Cracow, which resulted in the disruption of their clandestine press and the seizure of a number of documents.[34] By that time all negotiations for reunion had been broken off, and by November the conflict flared up in open violence in the streets of Cracow.[35]

The conflict constantly grew more bitter, not only in the Generalgouvernement, but also in Greater Germany. Here all Ukrainians (except the adherents of the Het'man's Hromada, who, as has been pointed out, were in the great majority East Ukrainians) were supposed to be joined in the UNO (Ukraïns'ke Natsional'ne Ob"iednannia—Ukrainian National Union) which was accorded semiofficial recognition by the German authorities. Officially the organization was nonpartisan; it recognized nationalism as the guiding ideology, however, and in practice was a social and welfare adjunct of the OUN.[36] At the head of this group stood Colonel Tymosh Omel'chenko who, like the other leading members, was a strong supporter of the Nationalists. Like most of their generation, these men sided with Mel'nyk and the "legitimate" Provid when the younger generation broke away. They ordered all members to report attempts at "disruptive work" [37] and eventually cleansed the organization of active supporters of Bandera.[38] Their stand was of importance, for the UNO was constantly growing in numbers and strength in this period, due to the heavy influx of Ukrainians from the areas occupied by Hungary and the USSR. Whereas in 1937 it had only a few score members, nearly four hundred were added in 1938, about two thousand in 1939, and almost eleven thousand in 1940.[39] Since the Ukrainian immigrants were largely factory and agricultural workers, branches were formed in numerous towns throughout

[33] Interview 9.
[34] *OUN u Viini*, p. 33*n*; Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), p. 4.
[35] *Nastup*, November 16, 1940; *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, December 1, 1940, p. 1.
[36] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, January 10, 1943, p. 3.
[37] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, September 10, 1940, p. 2.
[38] Cf. Occ E-4 (5).
[39] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, January 10, 1943, p. 8.

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Germany proper, the Protectorate, and the districts newly annexed from Poland.[40] As they were unable to control the accepted organization, however, Bandera's supporters rapidly set about forming cells of their own. Thus by 1941 there were parallel and antagonistic centers of Ukrainian life in many towns and industrial establishments in Greater Germany.[41]

In their efforts to win control of the nationalist movement, both parties resorted to arguments as well as organizational pressure. Much of this was oral, especially on the part of the *krai* group which, in comparison with the Mel'nyk following, possessed neither the physical plant nor the experienced polemicists for a press contest. They stressed the hesitancy and failures of the older Provid, argued that it was dependent on foreigners, and asserted that the other generation of leaders wished to revert to a purely military, tactical organization of the UVO type, leaving political and ideological questions to the legal parties like the UNDO.[42] Fundamentally, however, as previously indicated, the rebels' appeal was to youth, will, action.

The rebuttal offered by Mel'nyk's supporters is easier to follow because it could be expressed in openly published periodicals, although in a somewhat veiled form. Part of the defense was provided by nonmembers, especially by church leaders. Bishop John Buchko, who was considered to be a close associate of Sheptyts'kyi, and who later headed the entire Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, was vigorous in his praise of Mel'nyk. The bishop was at the time in America, where he was making a pastoral visit to Ukrainian immigrants; in an interview in New York he was reported to have declared that the Ukrainian Nationalists represented the flower of the nation and to have said they possessed in Mel'nyk an outstanding personality as

[40] That is, Posen and West Prussia; the UNO did not exist in the Generalgouvernement.

[41] As was indicated somewhat later by the ability of Bandera's followers to obtain from groups of Ukrainians working in Germany the submission of numerous petitions for his release from imprisonment. These documents may be found in Occ E-4 (9), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [9]). See also the denunciation of "diversive work" among Ukrainian workers in Germany in *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, March 30, 1941, p. 1.

[42] Bandera, p. 2. Unfortunately, I have not been able to secure any of the semiclandestine publications of this period. Substantially the same arguments are repeated in a clandestine publication of April, 1942 (*Biuleten'*, No. 4, pp. 5–7).

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leader.[43] As previously noted, Monsignor Voloshyn likewise chose this time to praise Mel'nyk above other Nationalist leaders. In spite of the prestige of their authors, however, it is questionable whether such statements were conducive to strengthening Mel'nyk's position in view of the pronounced anticlericalism of the youthful circles.[44]

A major part of the Mel'nyk adherents' argument, however, consisted of emphasis on the duty, in an authoritarian organization such as the OUN, of subordination to the leadership. As has been shown, Mel'nyk's own character and views rendered this line somewhat ineffective. Nevertheless, the party organs came to carry more and more eulogies of the director, and theoretical discussions of the nature of his position became more frequent.[45] A major problem for any authoritarian organization is the establishment of the legitimacy of the leader. If force cannot quell doubts, appeal must be made to his sanction by some figure of the past who is held in veneration by all. Therefore it was firmly asserted that Konovalets' had designated Mel'nyk as his successor, and that Mel'nyk had called the Rome congress in compliance with his long-range instructions.[46] Those "calling themselves nationalists" yet falling into the "democratic-liberal vices" of individual defiance of authority and party intrigue were roundly denounced.[47] Somewhat later, in stressing the military duty of members of the OUN to observe discipline, one spokesman of the "legitimate" group declared that exclusion from the organization meant "moral death."[48]

There remained yet another area in which the struggle for power was waged. It has been noted that nearly all of the in-

[43] *Nastup*, October 19, 1940, p. 3.

[44] Other influential elements supported Mel'nyk, or at least condemned the tactics of Bandera's followers, but were more guarded in their criticism. Kubiiovych wrote an article deploring the political rashness and violence of the youth (*Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, March 30, 1941, p. 1). A number of professors addressed an appeal for national unity above party interests to Ukrainian youths in the higher schools in Greater Germany (*Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 10, 1941, p. 1).

[45] E.g., on December 14, 1940, *Nastup* devoted the entire first page to Mel'nyk on the occasion of his birthday; again, on December 21, almost all of page 1 was devoted to him.

[46] *Nastup*, October 5, 1940, p. 1.

[47] *Nastup*, October 12, 1940, p. 1.

[48] *Nastup*, May 24, 1941, p. 4.

668* 578 fluential older members rejected the proposals of the Bandera group for alliance. There was one exception—Iarii. The adopted Ukrainian had for some time been at odds with Mel'nyk concerning, it is said, financial accounting and his own desire for freedom from Mel'nyk's control in negotiating with the Germans.[49] In the emergence of a new center Iarii evidently saw an opportunity to escape distasteful subordination to what he considered an émigré clique which was hopelessly confused as to its real aims. Consequently, he broke completely with the old Provid and brought his valuable contacts to the *krai* group, in whose youthful energy he saw the only hope for developing a liberation force.[50] In so doing, however, he helped turn many Ukrainian elements against the new movement, for it appeared strange that among members of the Provid the foreigner alone should have joined Bandera's group. Almost from the beginning this circumstance appears to have given rise to the suspicion that foreign powers—the Soviet Union as well as Germany—had inspired the rebellion to weaken the Nationalist movement.[51] Just what Iarii's relationship to the Germans was is hard to determine, but it appears fairly certain that rumors that he was connected with the Communists are unfounded.

668* Such suspicions did not, however, prevent the *krai* group from proceeding with its organization. As will be shown, a strong network of underground workers was maintained in Soviet-occupied Galicia under authority of the insurgent Provid. In the Generalgouvernement, too, considerable progress was registered. In March, 1941, a general conference of the "OUN-B[andera]" was held in Cracow, called, in rejection of the Rome conference, the "Second Congress of the OUN."[52] By this time, a large part of the younger generation was included in the new movement, and already sub-factions were beginning to appear. On the one hand, the "activists," Bandera and his first lieutenant, Stets'ko, remained

[49] Interview 67.

[50] According to a letter which Iarii wrote to me, dated Easter, 1953.

[51] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, September 10, 1940, p. 2.

[52] Mykola (Nicholas) Lebed', *UPA: Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia* (UPA: The Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army) (Presove Biuro UHVR, 1946), p. 14; Petro Mirchuk, *Akt vidnovlennia ukraïns'koï derzhavnosty, 30 chervnia 1941 roku* (The Act of Renewal of Ukrainian Statehood, June 30, 1941) (New York: Holovna Uprava Orgaiizatsii Oborony Chotyr'okh Svobid Ukraïny, 1952), p. 17.

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important event in the development of the Zhitomir base—the arrival there of the major leaders of the party, who came to take personal direction of the campaign to win the east. Mel'nyk himself remained behind, perhaps because his departure would have aroused German mistrust, but the top level of the Provid was represented by both Senyk and Stsibors'kyi. With them came Dr. Kandyba, the son of a famous East Ukrainian poet, then still living in emigration. Kandyba, best known as "Ol'zhych," was a young man, still in his thirties. Though trained as an archeologist, for several years he had been very prominent in the ranks of OUN leadership just below the level of the Provid. He was now placed in direct charge of all the advance groups in the East Ukraine.[60]

The three leaders had crossed Galicia in the middle of August, stopping briefly in L'vov. They were careful not to advertise their journey; apparently neither here nor in crossing the border into Volhynia—where a special pass was officially required—were they molested by the Germans. The OUN-M has always denied that there was any agreement with the latter concerning this expedition, but it is highly probable that the Wehrmacht officials in control knew about it, at least unofficially. At any rate, once they had reached Zhitomir, in the last days of August, the OUN leaders acted quite openly. However, their mission came to an abrupt end.

At seven thirty on the warm summer evening of August 30, as Senyk and Stsibors'kyi, returning from a gathering of the regional police, were approaching the main street intersection of Zhitomir, a young man approached them from behind and fired two or three pistol shots. One penetrated the back of Senyk's neck; he died instantly. Stsibors'kyi was shot through both cheeks and bled to death a few hours later.[61]

The assassin was shot down by Ukrainian and German policemen as he attempted to flee; a vehicle from the German police command came up immediately afterwards and removed the body. Consequently it was difficult to determine who had insti-

[60] *OUN u Viini*, p. 54.

[61] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3; and the report of an eyewitness to the crime, Interview 35.

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gated the murder. The man's passport, however, indicated that his name was Stephen Kozyi, and that he was a West Ukrainian.[62] Almost at once the Mel'nyk adherents accused the OUN-B of having ordered the assassination, asserting that Kozyi was a member of their group. Strong support was given to their allegation by the following circumstances: (1) the bitter attacks leveled by the OUN-B against the two murdered leaders;[63] (2) the fact, attested in a secret report by one of the most competent German specialists on the Ukraine, that Bandera followers distributed leaflets in Kiev justifying the assassinations shortly after they had occurred;[64] (3) the existence of a secret directive by the OUN-B Provid stating that Mel'nyk leaders were not to be allowed to reach Kiev. Mel'nyk adherents at the time referred to a "death sentence" passed on the two leaders "long before" by the Bandera leadership. Discussing entirely separate events, a pro-Bandera writer has recently declared that the rules of the "Second Bandera Congress" of the OUN forbade "Mel'nyk divergentists" working in the Ukraine.[65] That the OUN-M leaders knew the Bandera supporters might resort to violence is fairly certain. OUN-M sympathizers reported soon after the murders that Senyk and Stsibors'kyi had been warned by friends against the dangers from the rival faction.[66] After the war an official OUN-M source quoted a general warning issued by Mel'nyk in the spring of 1941 concerning his opponents' plans to kill OUN-M leaders.[67]

The OUN-B, on the other hand, has always denied complicity in the crime. It asserts that the deed was the work either of German agents, who intended to weaken the OUN-M by depriving it of leaders who had occasionally opposed German policies and who at the same time intended to arouse Ukrainian opinion against the Bandera group, or of Communists intent on causing conflict between the two Nationalist parties. Some credence is given to the latter theory by the fact that immediately after the

[62] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3; Interview 35.

[63] An article by a "nonparty correspondent" in *Nastup*, October 11, 1941, p. 4, declared that Bandera had proclaimed long before that Senyk and Stsibors'kyi would be the first whom he would destroy "in the Ukrainian lands."

[64] PS 053.

[65] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 1; Chubai, p. 54.

[66] Mykola Halahan in *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, September 28, 1941, p. 2.

[67] This is quoted in *OUN u Vinni*, p. 43.

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668* 578 event the OUN-M accounts described Kazyi as a "hardened Communist," who had, however, turned to the Bandera party.[68] It is difficult to tell whether there was any basis for this statement, for the Mel'nyk adherents were endeavoring to link Bandera's followers to Moscow, which, they assert, had inspired these murders as it had those of Petliura and Konovalets'.[69] Since then, however, there have been rumors that a Ukrainian who was admittedly a former Communist had been in touch with Senyk and Stsibors'kyi, leading to the suspicion that Soviet agents may have planted a betrayer in their entourage.

In view of these discrepancies, it is impossible to be sure who the real authors of the crime were. Knowing the principles and temperament of the Bandera group, however, one must admit that such a deed might not have been repugnant to them. The issuance of a categorical order like that mentioned above, in the heated atmosphere of the period, could very well have led a reckless young member of the OUN-B to the commission of murder. Whether a direct order for the act was given, or whether the consequences of the general order were envisaged by the Bandera Provid at the time it was issued, are questions which can scarcely be answered.

The bloody deed had two immediate results. In the first place it enormously increased the tension between the two factions of the OUN. The Mel'nyk group immediately launched a violent press campaign against the opposing party. It alleged that the OUN-B had carried out a whole series of assassinations of Mel'nyk members in the preceding three months. These are supposed to have included the regional director John Mitsyk and his deputy, Alexander Kuts, in Volhynia, and two leaders of the OUN-M advance groups, Shul'ha and Shubs'kyi.[70] An editorial in *Nastup* declared that "the time of amnesty for them [the Bandera adherents] is past, their sins cannot be forgiven."[71] Mel'nyk, however, refused to countenance violent reprisals. In the same

[68] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3.
[69] *Nastup*, October 4, 1941, p. 4; cf. Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 101, October 2, 1941, pp. 3–4, NO 3157 (hereafter referred to as NO 3157).
[70] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3; *OUN u Viini*, p. 48.
[71] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3.

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issue of *Nastup* he laid full responsibility for the crime on the "divergentists," but merely ordered all Ukrainians to refrain from contact with them and expressed the hope that the tragedy would purge Ukrainian life of crime and anarchy.[72]

Whatever responsibility they may have borne for the assassinations, the Bandera followers were quickly visited with retribution. The Germans arrested all OUN-B members in Zhitomir itself, and a number were executed. During the early part of September, SS *Einsatzgruppen* arrested and executed most of the members of three of the subgroups of the southern task force, at Balta, Nikolaev, and the Crimean city of Dzhankoi.[73] In Nikolaev at least, the OUN-M adherents denounced their pro-Bandera rivals to the Germans.[74] The expedition to the southern peninsula had been a favorite project of the OUN-B, and its complete annihilation was a severe blow to their hopes. Moreover, although some members were able to go underground, OUN-B activity in Kirovograd and Krivoi Rog (Krivyi Rih) and other places in the south-central Ukraine was seriously crippled. Still more disheartening, the sections of the northern task forces which had been heading for Kiev to "proclaim" the Ukrainian state there, as had been done in L'vov, were broken up by the Germans in Vasil'kov (Vasyl'kiv) and Fastov (Fastiv).[75] Some of the members fled to Polessia, where they hid in the forests; a few apparently slipped by secretly into the capital. Significantly for the direction of future operations, the chief remaining center of the OUN-B was in Dniepropetrovsk.

That indignation over the murders prompted this far-reaching repression of the Bandera party is improbable in view of the contempt in which the SS at least held all Ukrainians. Neverthe-

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[73] Matla, p. 22. That the arrests were not all part of a concerted plan is indicated by the fact that part were carried out by the Rumanians in their area of occupation. The latter warned the Ukrainians to get out of this area but told them they did not care what they did on the other side of the line of demarcation (cf. Chubai, p. 56). The executions in Zhitomir evidently took place immediately after the assassinations (Ie. Stakhiv, p. 39). On the destruction of the Crimean groups see also Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the *Einsatzgruppen* of the SP and the SD in the USSR, December, 1941, NO 2659 (hereafter referred to as NO 2659).

[74] The accusation to this effect in Matla, p. 22, is confirmed by NO 3157.

[75] PS 053.

[Killing of Senyk a Stsibors'kyi, August 30, 1941 -- Analyst]

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reserved for the capital. A number of OUN-M activities there, without being considered important enough to require drastic action, had contributed to a feeling of irritation on the part of the Himmler henchmen. A famous poetess, Olena Teliha, had created an unauthorized Nationalist literary periodical, *Litvary*. A youth group Sich was considered potentially dangerous. A Ukrainian National Council (Rada) had been formed by the Mel'nyk group to act as a symbol of unity in the East Ukraine and, they hoped, eventually to become the central organ of nationalist activities. The risks involved in such activity, in view of the attitude of the real rulers of Germany, were fully understood by the Wehrmacht officers, one of whom advised the Ukrainians to transform the Council into a more innocuous Aid Committee. When this advice was refused, the Council was formally dissolved (November 17), and went underground.[25] The SP authorities were aware of the organ's continued existence, and while they regarded it as too insignificant for immediate suppression, it increased their distrust of the Nationalists.[26] With this background, one can understand why the first blow fell upon the legal, but extremely Nationalist, *Ukraïns'ke Slovo*. Its large circulation—over fifty thousand [27]—gave it, in the eyes of the police, the potentiality of dangerous influence. Moreover, the editorial staff of this organ, as was previously noted, was composed very largely of West Ukrainians and old émigrés; these elements were regarded as especially dangerous by the SS leadership.

Unfortunately for the Nationalist cause, during their two months' activity in Kiev the newcomers had also lost ground in local opinion. Some of the antipathy which they aroused stemmed from the fact that they were outsiders; even those who had been born in the East Ukraine or, like Kandyba, whose father had been born there, had long been out of touch with the local population. With some justification, because they were better organized, had clearer concepts of what they wanted, and were used to displaying initiative, the OUN group took a leading, oc-

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 68.
[26] PS 3876.
[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 15, 1942, p. 5.

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casionally a monopolistic part in municipal activities. As was inevitable, they sometimes exhibited an attitude of superiority; even when they behaved more tactfully, many local inhabitants nevertheless were inclined to suspect that they harbored such an attitude. Their presence in municipal offices, even when they were on a plane of equality with local officeholders, was bound to lead to some friction. Moreover, emphasis on the principle of integral nationalism meant the neglect of social welfare and civil rights questions which were of great concern to the local population after twenty years of Soviet rule. The "leader principle," which was expressed in the East Ukraine in as extreme terms as Mel'nyk ever permitted it in the emigration, was alien to the native inhabitants. The slogan "Petliura, Konovalets', Mel'nyk—three names, one idea" was at first meaningless to the average East Ukrainian, since the second and third of these names were unknown to him. When their meaning was explained, the phrase signified to many that after Petliura's death the nationalist movement had fallen into the hands of leaders from the half-alien West Ukraine.[28]

All of these irritations might have been accepted, however, had it not been for an ideological theme which resulted in more practical discomfort. The Nationalist creed required emphasis on the "purity" of the Ukrainian people. According to the OUN leaders' belief, this "purity" had been endangered by the intrusion of Russian elements—the physical immigration of Russians, who had become especially numerous in Kiev bureaucratic and intellectual circles, and the penetration of Russian influences into Ukrainian culture and speech. The extent of this penetration will be discussed in a later chapter; it is necessary to point out its importance here, however, in order to understand the Kiev reaction to OUN policy. The Nationalists set about radically "purging"

[28] Surviving OUN-M publications of this period are rare, many existing only in private collections. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk* of September 28, 1941, p. 3 contains a reprint of a leaflet distributed in the East Ukraine describing Mel'nyk as the successor of Konovalets', who in turn was a successor of Petliura, "killed by the Jew Shvartsvart." For a criticism of OUN propaganda in the East Ukraine during this period, and notes on the reaction of the local population, see the account of the East Ukrainian émigré Fedir (Theodore) S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2.

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surrounding areas, as because it exerted influence upon them. The chief channels by which it did so were the Prosvita organizations, the newspaper, and the church. A leader of the independent nationalist group estimates that its influence, exercised primarily through the Prosvita, reached as far west as Lubny and Poltava,[16] and there is evidence that it also played a part in organization as far south as the northern Donbas.[17] *Nova Ukraïna* was also widely known, serving as a model for nationalist editors in the "Left Bank" region who wanted to pursue as independent a line as possible and hence rejected the guidance of *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo*.

The special role played by the church of Kharkov merits more than passing mention. When the Germans arrived, they found that an elderly prelate, Archbishop Theophilus, had survived the Soviet period. Seventy-six years old, a native of a village of the Khoral (Khorol) region in the heart of the "Left Bank" Ukraine, he had become a priest in 1885.[18] With the aid of local clergymen, he reassumed control of ecclesiastical life in Kharkov in late 1941 and claimed to be in charge of the entire "Left Bank" as Metropolitan of the Ukraine.[19] Many—especially in the Autocephalous Church—criticized him because he was consecrated bishop in the Russian Orthodox Church (in 1923) and because he continued to use Old Slavonic in the liturgy.[20] Others, however, saw him as a Ukrainian patriot, since he was Ukrainian by birth, spoke pure Ukrainian, celebrated a service in commemoration of Kruty, and praised the Ukrainian newspaper.[21] At any rate the dissidents were able to make little progress against him; only two Lypkivite priests had survived, while Theophilus's clergy numbered more than one hundred.[22] However, the latter appear to have been subjected to very loose control by the archbishop and

[16] *Ibid.*
[17] Interview 68.
[18] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 15, 1943, p. 3.
[19] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 5, 1943, p. 2; March 6, 1942, p. 3.
[20] Interview 69. A letter to Archbishop Hilarion from one of his former pupils in the Kharkov area, asking his advice on reorganization of the church, suggests that all were not satisfied with Theophilus' ascendancy, even at an early date (*Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, February 10, 1942, p. 4).
[21] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 5, 1942, p. 4; January 24, 1943, p. 2; May 15, 1943, p. 3.
[22] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, February 10, 1942, p. 4; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 5, 1943, p. 2.

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to have employed Ukrainian or Slavonic in the services according to their own inclination. Consequently, the divergences of the clergy can be used as a gauge of popular feeling on the "Left" as well as the "Right Bank," but the actual conflicts were muted, as were the strictly political rivalries, by the presence of a respected, moderate central authority.

It is true, however, that conflict was sharper in the area west of Kharkov than in its immediate vicinity. Poltava, the second city of the region under consideration, was one of the most purely Ukrainian of cities of considerable size. Too far east to have been the center for a large Jewish population, the removal of this group and the drastic reduction of the Russian element made it more than ninety percent Ukrainian, according to the city census. The nationalist groups were quick to organize there; largely with the help of OUN-M workers, the paper came under their control in November, 1941, and an East Ukrainian member of the Mel'nyk group, a former officer of the Republican army, became mayor.[23] Cultural life was rapidly renewed, two Ukrainian theaters being opened.[24] On the other hand, church organization was disrupted by quarrels between the priests preferring to introduce Ukrainian into the services and those wishing to retain Slavonic; the latter predominated in the city.[25] The former group, however, with sixty parishes in the countryside, joined the Autocephalous Church, and Ihor of Belaia Tserkov' was appointed their bishop.[26] Theophilus continued, however, to claim their allegiance.

Sometime in 1942, the Ukrainian editorial staff and the mayor were shot by German police; the city passed under the control of a Russian mayor, while the new Ukrainian editor could not assert himself against the tight German control.[27] Even earlier, several other nationalist editors in the area had been shot for evading German restrictions.[28] Some of the newspapers came under the control of nonentities who were fully subservient to the

[23] *OUN u Viini*, p. 76; Interview 42.
[24] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[25] *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3.
[26] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, September 6–7, 1942, p. 2. It is doubtful whether he actually resided in Poltava, however, since he is later again reported as bishop of Belaia Tserkov'.
[27] Interviews 1, 42; *OUN u Viini*, p. 76.
[28] Interview 47.